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L'article 96 de la Loi 
contitutionnelle de 1867 
A Response to the Suggested Amendment 
Relating to Provincial Administrative Tribunals 
THE CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION * 
L'objet de cette étude est de proposer les changements qui pourraient être 
apportés à l'article 96 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 et d'examiner les 
propositions du Gouvernement canadien à cet effet. L'accent est mis sur une 
vision équilibrée des facteurs suivants: un examen du rôle légitime des 
tribunaux administratifs et des cours inférieures dans notre système judiciaire, 
le respect et la sauvegarde du rôle des cours supérieures et la nécessité 
d'indépendance et d'impartialité des tribunaux. 
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Preface 
The Canadian Bar Association formed a Committee to respond to the 
Discussion Paper which proposes an Amendment to the Judicature Pro-
visions of the Constitution Act, 1867. A letter was sent to all Provincial 
Branch Presidents and National Section Chairmen in September outlining 
the issues and asking for submissions to be made by the widest possible 
cross-section of the Bar. Copies of that letter were sent to each Law Society 
or governing professional body and Deans of law schools. 
In October and November a Committee of the Canadian Bar Association 
was established to study and report on the proposed Amendment. The 
composition of the Committee was as follows: 
L.M. BLOND, Chairman 
National Chairman of the Constitutional and International Law 
Section, in Private Practice in Civil Litigation in Vancouver with 
Harper, Grey, Easton and Company 
DAVID MATAS, Past National Chairman of the Constitutional 
and International Law Section, Winnipeg Practitioner in Immi-
gration and Administrative Law 
JAMES MacPHERSON, Formerly Professor of Law, University 
of Victoria, now Director, Constitutional Law, Government of 
Saskatchewan 
BERNARD COURTOIS, Former National Chairman of the 
Administrative Law Section, Practitioner in Administrative Law in 
Ottawa-Hull with the Firm of Lavery, O'Brien 
C.W. MacINTOSH, Q.C., National Chairman of the Corporate 
Law Section, Legal Advisor to the Council of Maritime Premiers in 
Halifax 
ARTHUR GANS, National Chairman of the Civil Litigation 
Section in Private Practice with Miller, Thomson, Sedgewick, 
Lewis and Healy in Toronto 
The Committee met twice on December 4 and 5, 1983 and January 29, 1984. 
There was a telephone conference discussion on February 15, 1984. 
The President of the C.B.A. Robert H. McKercher, Q.C. attended the 
first meeting of the Committee and provided valuable assistance throughout. 
He was aided in this by Alec C. Robertson, Esq., a Member of the Executive 
Committee. The Committee considered a wide range of responses from other 
Members of the Bar and was particularly assisted by correspondence with 
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Professor Noel Lyon of Queens University. There were discussions with 
members of the bench, notably the Canadian Judges Conference and its 
Committee studying this issue and a similar Committee for the Canadian 
Judicial Council. The Canadian Bar Association is fortunate to also have a 
Paper recently published by a Joint Committee of the Quebec Branch of the 
C.B.A. and the Quebec Bar. 
This Paper represents the best effort of our Association to study this 
proposal given the limited time available and the numerous issues that it 
raises. 
Introduction 
Provincial Governments, acting pursuant to the authority vested in 
them by section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, enact laws in many 
substantive areas. The effectiveness of many of these laws requires that 
somebody interpret and apply them. Traditionally, courts have been a 
central institution for performing those functions. In recent years, however, 
in Canada and in most other western democracies, governments have often 
turned to so-called « administrative tribunals » to perform these functions in 
many fields — labour relations, public utilities, human rights and environ-
mental protection, to name but a few. 
The assignment of powers of interpretation, application and adjudication 
by provincial governments to administrative tribunals has raised important 
issues of constitutional law. Although some of those issues have not yet been 
resolved, the case law seems to mark out two clear starting points. First, 
there is no question that provincial legislatures have the jurisdiction to 
establish administrative tribunals to interpret and apply provincial laws. 
Secondly, it is also apparent that provincial legislatures can give judicial 
powers to those tribunals. 
There is, however, an important restriction to this picture of general 
provincial jurisdiction and freedom to establish administrative tribunals and 
endow them with judicial powers. That restriction is by operation of 
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides : 
96. The Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District 
and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 
In spite of its seemingly clear and relatively innocuous wording, by a 
long process of judicial interpretation section 96 today seems to consist of 
three components. 
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First and most obviously, it is an appointment power. Section 96 
authorizes the federal government to appoint judges to the provincial 
superior courts. 
Secondly, section 96 has been interpreted as preserving the supervisory 
power of the superior courts to review, on jurisdictional grounds, the 
decisions of provincial courts and administrative tribunals. This component 
of section 96 was explicitly enunciated only recently by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Crevier v. Attorney General (Quebec) '. 
Thirdly, recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada indicate that 
section 96 also reserves a core of subject matters (defined in terms of factors 
of history and importance) which must be heard by superior courts. For 
example, in Re Residential Tenancies Act, 19792, the Court held that a 
provincial residential tenancy commission could not make eviction and 
compliance orders, even though landlord and tenant matters are clearly 
within provincial jurisdiction. Similarly, in Reference Re Section 6 of the 
Family Relations Acty, the Court held that a provincial family court could 
not make orders with respect to occupancy of the family residence or non-
entry, even though family law matters are clearly within provincial juris-
diction. 
It is this third component of section 96 which has frustrated provincial 
governments and encouraged them to propose that section 96 be amended. 
The thrust of the proposed amendment is that provincial governments which 
have the power under section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to enact 
substantive laws in particular fields should also have the power to assign the 
application of those laws to courts and administrative tribunals of their 
choice. In other words, section 96, as currently interpreted, seriously 
frustrates the ability of Provincial Governments to provide for the adminis-
tration of laws which are admittedly within their jurisdiction to enact. 
We have sympathy for the concerns expressed by provincial governments 
about section 96. We believe that section 96 has two detrimental effects on 
the administration of justice today : 
(1) The current interpretation of section 96 is too restrictive. It does not 
recognize that for a variety of reasons (e.g. speed, cost, informality of 
procedures, specialized decision-making, experimentation with diffe-
rent models of dispute resolution) administrative tribunals can be a 
1. [1981] 2 S.CR. 220. 
2. [1981] 1 S.CR. 714. 
3. (1982) 131 D.L.R. (3d) 257. 
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preferred mechanism for applying provincial laws in certain cate-
gories. The legitimate role of administrative tribunals and provincial 
courts has been well-described by Estey J. in Reference Re Section 6 
of the Family Relations Act. In discussing the proper interpretation of 
section 96, Estey J. said this : 
A permissive view is, of course, more easily adopted when the constitutional 
scan is directed to an administrative tribunal operating under a statute which 
outlines the policy of the Legislature and which leaves much of the imple-
mentation and application ofthat policy to a board appointed sometimes with 
a qualifying background related to the regulated field. But it has almost equal 
importance and value when the programme outlined in the enabling statute 
lends itself to interpretation and application in the quick and relatively less 
expensive summary procedures of the so-called inferior tribunals. The rights 
and duties created by such statutes frequently are of a kind or are directed to a 
sector of the community so as to be better and more expeditiously realized and 
interpreted by the less formal and less demanding procedures of the provincial 
court. It is not to denigrate the role of the superior court or its efficacy in the 
modern community. It is only to say that the highly refined techniques evolved 
over profound difficulties arising in the community are unnecessary for the 
disposition of much of the traffic directed to the magisterial courts by 
contemporary provincial legislation. That traffic can sometimes bear neither 
the cost nor the time which sometimes inevitably must be borne or devoted by 
the parties to causes in the courts of general jurisdiction (the descendants of the 
Royal Courts of Justice) and the county courts.4 
(2) The current interpretation of section 96 imposes serious restrictions 
on the ability of provincial governments to create administrative 
tribunals while not imposing similar restrictions on the federal 
government. If the philosophy underlying the current interpretation 
of section 96 is that there should be a unitary court system in Canada 
with superior courts at the apex then it seems strange and unfair that 
provincial freedom to establish administrative tribunals should be 
reined in while at the same time the federal government remains free 
to create a vast array of federal administrative tribunals. 
There is a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, McEvoy v. 
Attorney General (New Brunswick)5, stating that section 96 also applies to the 
federal government. But, the fact remains that section 96 has traditionally 
imposed restrictions on only the provincial order of government. That does 
not seem appropriate to us. 
This then, is the nature of the so-called « Section 96 Problem » as we see 
it. Governments are attempting to solve the problems by amending Sec-
tion 96. The Federal Government's discussion paper sets forth one possibility. 
4. Idem, p. 291. 
5. (1983) 148D.L.R. (3d) 25. 
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We are sympathetic with the need for reform. However, we believe that any 
solution to the problem must be based on a proper balancing of three 
important factors : 
(1) An appreciation of the legitimate role of administrative tribunals 
and inferior courts in our legal system ; 
(2) Respect for and safeguarding of the traditional and valuable role of 
superior courts in our legal system ; 
(3) The desirability of insuring that courts and tribunals established to 
resolve disputes according to the law are independent and impartial. 
1. The Solution 
Once it is accepted that section 96 poses unacceptable problems in the 
justice system, the question then becomes, what is the solution? We have 
considered whether any options short of a constitutional amendment might 
solve the problems. Unfortunately, because the problems are created by a 
constitutional provision, ordinary statutory solutions or solutions involving 
some form of federal-provincial agreement or delegation of powers are not 
likely to be sufficient. An amendment to section 96 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 is necessary. 
The question then becomes, what form should the amendment take? 
Should the amendment be a list (perhaps in the form of a schedule) of 
provincial administrative tribunals (e.g. residential tenancy commission) or 
perhaps provincial legislative subject matters (e.g. landlord and tenant) 
which would not be subject to the constraints of section 96? Or should the 
amendment be expressed in general language and attempt to articulate 
general principles which would structure the ability of provincial governments 
to establish administrative tribunals? 
We have considered this matter and believe that an amendment of the 
second type is preferable. A Constitution is a framework document; it 
should paint in broad brush strokes. A Constitution should, therefore, state 
general principles which should then be applied in individual instances. A 
«laundry list» of non-section 96 tribunals or subject matters would not fit 
that format. 
2. Fundamental Organizing Principles 
If section 96 is to be amended, the amendment must take account of and 
reflect several important goals. In its discussion paper entitled A Suggested 
Amendment Relating to Provincial Administrative Tribunals the federal 
government has set out five fundamental principles that should be promoted 
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by any amendment to section 96. These principles were that section 96 (or 
other provisions in the Constitution) should: 
1. guarantee the existence of a superior court of general jurisdiction in 
each province; 
2. guarantee the independence of the judiciary ; 
3. enable a province to establish bodies to administer the application of 
its laws ; 
4. enshrine the power of judicial review in the superior court of general 
jurisdiction; and 
5. provide that there not be a dual system of courts. 
We agree with these principles and would simply add a sixth : 
6. Section 96 restrictions should be applied equally to tribunals created 
by both orders of government. 
3. Analysis of Suggested Amendment 96B(1)(2) 
The suggested amendment in the discussion paper published in August 
by the Minister of Justice is : 
96B. (1) Notwithstanding section 96, the Legislature of each Province may 
confer on any tribunal, board, commission or authority, other than a court, 
established pursuant to the laws of the Province, concurrent or exclusive 
jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the legislative authority of the 
Province. 
(2) Any decision of a tribunal, board, commission or authority on which 
any jurisdiction of a superior court is conferred under subsection (1) is subject 
to review by a superior court of the Province for want or excess of jurisdiction. 
96B. (1) Par dérogation à l'article 96, la législature d'une province peut, dans 
les domaines ressortissant à son pouvoir législatif, attribuer compétence 
concurrente ou exclusive à tout tribunal, organisme ou autre autorité non 
judiciaire constituée en vertu d'une loi de la province. 
(2) Les décisions des autorités à qui a été attribuée compétence de cour 
supérieure en vertu du paragraphe (1) sont susceptibles de révision par une 
cour supérieure de la province pour défaut ou excès de pouvoir. 
It is our view that the language is unsatisfactory. Some of the problem 
areas we have identified are as follows : 
— The Hierarchy of Courts 
The proposal concentrates upon but one part of the section 96 
« problem » (administrative tribunals) and overlooks the relationship that 
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does and might well exist between provincial courts (civil and criminal) and 
provincial superior courts. 
— « Other than a Court » 
The words « ... other than a court... » found in line 2 of subsection 96B(1) 
may engender confusion in that : 
(1) The draftsman's intention probably was to permit the existence of 
tribunals or boards, etc., whose sole or central function is judicial. 
The words used may be interpreted by courts to disallow the creation 
of such a body if it is found to be « a court » ; 
(2) A distinction is created between «courts» on the one hand and 
« tribunals, boards, commissions or authorities », on the other hand, 
without a definition for either ; 
(3) A limitation is created by exempting «courts» (however created) 
from assuming any section 96 type powers. These words, on their 
face, appear to prevent provincial governments from assigning any 
new matter to provincial courts. This would be a startling and 
undesirable result because obviously provincial courts may be an 
appropriate forum for many matters. We believe an amendment to 
the Constitution should not preclude this ; 
(4) Perhaps, as a corollary to the McEvoy decision, the wording of the 
government draft precludes assignment of powers to federally 
appointed adjudicative tribunals. This should be considered for any 
amendment. There are four possible ways power can be assigned to 
administration tribunals. Provinces may confer powers to either 
provincially appointed of federally appointed tribunals, and Parlia-
ment may confer its power to either provincially or federally appointed 
tribunals. The Government draft deals with only one of these 
possibilities, a Province conferring powers on a provincially appoint-
ed tribunal. Both orders of Government should be permitted to 
assign to any tribunal. 
— 96B(2) Judicial Review 
We have found the question of judicial review poses serious difficulties. 
On the one hand, administrative tribunals should be allowed to function 
without appeals which can by their very nature frustrate the purposes for 
which those tribunals were created. On the other hand, the Rule of Law 
should be recognized and the supervisory jurisdiction of superior courts 
should not be unduly restricted. The concept of judicial review for « want or 
excess of jurisdiction » is a developing concept that does include a review for 
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« denial of natural justice and fairness » and for « errors of law which are 
fundamental». Review for «error of law», simply, may be open to wide 
interpretation with the result that the review assumes the character of an 
appeal. For guidance, we looked at the general supervisory powers of 
superior courts. 
The Government proposes and we accept the proposition that adminis-
trative tribunal should be subject to entrenched judicial review. We believe 
the Government proposal is incomplete because it entrenches judicial review 
for Provincial tribunals, but not for Federal tribunals. 
4. A Redraft of Section 96 of the Canada Act 
We have attempted to redraft section 96 of the Constitution Act to meet 
the objections to the Government draft. The drafting attempt has served as 
an exercise in analyzing the problems with the section and with the proposed 
amendment. We felt it would be hollow to criticize the Government effort 
without making an effort of our own to solve current problems and avoid 
creating greater ones. 
— Maintaining Tribunals 
The Government proposal was necessitated by the failure of the courts 
to uphold tribunals whose sole or central function was judicial. These 
tribunals serve a purpose of specialization, speed, low cost, informality, and 
experimentation. The Committee felt they should not be invalidated catego-
rically. 
We propose : 
96A(1) The Legislature of each province may confer on any adjudicative 
tribunal jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the legislative authority of 
the province. 
— Federal Tribunals 
The Government proposal assumed that federal tribunals were not 
threatened by section 96, that only provincial tribunals were. Since the 
McEvoy decision that assumption may no longer be valid. In order to 
preserve federal tribunals, and our sixth principle, we propose : 
(2) Parliament may confer on any adjudicative tribunal jurisdiction in 
respect of any matter within the legislative authority of Parliament. 
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— Definition of •< Adjudicative Tribunal » 
Because « adjudicative tribunal» is a new term, it needs to be defined. 
The Government proposal referred to « tribunal, board, commission or 
authority, other than a court», but left open the question of what these 
entities are. 
We considered including in the proposed amendment a description of 
certain procedural trappings that distinguish many administrative tribunals 
from courts, in the form of simpler procedure and accordingly less elaborate 
procedural protection for parties. We concluded that it would not be 
appropriate to do so since this might encourage legislators, with a view to 
ensuring compliance with the proposed amendments, to prescribe a more 
reduced form of procedural protection than would otherwise be appropriate. 
We have two objectives in setting out the definition below. One is to 
encompass those tribunals that have to date been invalidated, i.e., those 
whose sole or central function is judicial. 
The second is to prevent the provinces and Parliament from transferring 
holus bolus to their own tribunals all matters within their own jurisdiction. 
New courts, in all but name, should not be created, to circumvent the 
appointment power now in section 96. We attempt to achieve this require-
ment by providing that there be a regulatory legislative scheme before 
jurisdiction can be transferred. Where the law is only a statement of rights 
and liabilities, tribunals should have no jurisdiction. Where the law esta-
blishes a system of administrative discretion and regulation, tribunals may 
have jurisdiction. 
We propose : 
(3) An «adjudicative tribunal» is a tribunal, board, commission, or 
authority : 
(a) whose sole or central function is judicial ; and 
(b) which is an element in a scheme for the administration or application of a 
regulatory statute in a specialized field. 
— Judicial Review 
The grounds of judicial review are many and varied and many of them 
overlap. For example, with respect to prohibition, Halsbury's Laws of 
England6 mentions excess of or absence of jurisdiction, departure from the 
rules of natural justice, improper delegation, interest, bias, alteration of the 
judgment. And with respect to certiorari, excess or lack of jurisdiction, error 
6. 4ii' ed., vol. l , p . 138. 
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of law on the face of the record, breach of the rules of natural justice, fraud, 
collusion or perjury7. With respect to judicial control generally, Halsbury's 
refers to the superior courts' « inherent supervisory jurisdiction over inferior 
courts and tribunals. If such a body has exceeded or acted without 
jurisdiction, or has failed to act fairly or in accordance with the rules of 
natural justice, or if it has made a determination exhibiting an error of law 
on the face of the record, its decision can be set aside. » 8 
Furthermore, the grounds for review are not cast in stone, and they 
have evolved substantially in recent years. Among recent examples in 
Canada, one can refer to Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of 
Commissioners of Police'3, with respect to the concept of fairness and 
Canadian Union of Public Employees v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.'0, with 
respect to the notions of preliminary or collateral matters or jurisdictional 
error. Also, section 28 of the Federal Court Act enumerates a number of 
grounds for judicial review. It was thought to comprise a fairly exhaustive 
list when the Act was passed in 1970, but it is generally acknowledged to 
require revision today, and the federal government is proposing to do just 
that. 
Accordingly, it was felt desirable to avoid a confining enumeration of 
grounds of review in a constitutional provision. We also wished to frame it in 
terms broad enough to encompass the full scope of the review power as 
presently applied by Canadian courts, and to allow for its continued 
evolution. 
To this end, it may be useful to briefly examine the historical source of 
the power being exercised by a superior court in the process of judicial 
review. 
Halsbury's Laws of England refers to prerogative writs and orders as the 
proceedings « by means of which the Queen's Bench Division exercises its 
ancient jurisdiction of supervising inferior courts, commanding magistrates 
and others to do what their duty requires in every case where there is no 
specific remedy (or no equally convenient and effective method of appeal) 
and protecting the liberty of the subject by speedy and summary inter-
position. » " 
7. Idem, p. 150. 
8. Idem, p. 51. 
9. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311. 
10. (1979)97D.L.R. (3d) 417. 
11. Vol. 11, p. 767. 
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In Attorney General of Quebec v. Farrah Lask in , C . J .C . , examines t he 
h i s to ry of this p o w e r in E n g l a n d , in C a n a d a general ly a n d in Q u e b e c , a n d it 
may be useful to repeat his c o m m e n t here : 
Ever since its creation in 1849 the Superior Court has been the court of original 
general jurisdiction in Quebec and has exercised over tribunals of inferior 
jurisdiction a supervisory power similar to that enjoyed at common law in 
England by the Court of King's Bench. In Three Rivers Boatman Ltd. v. Canada 
Labour Relations Board, Chief Justice Fauteux speaking for the Court said, 
at p. 615: 
(TRANSLATION) At its creation 1849, the Superior Court acquired in its entirety the original 
civil jurisdiction, in particular the supervisory jurisdiction, that had until that time been 
exercised by the Court of King's Bench : cf. 12 Victoria, c. 38, s. VII. At the same time it was 
provided that prerogative writs pertaining to the exercise of this supervisory jurisdiction would 
thenceforth emanate from the Superior Court: cf. 12 Victoria, c. 41, s. XVI. The Superior 
Court was thus invested with the supervisory power, based on the common law, that was 
exercised in England by the Court of King's bench on which our Court of King's Bench was 
modelled. This law of judicial control over courts, legal entitles or corporations exercising 
judicial or quasi-judicial powers comes to us from the English public law introduced into 
Quebec at the time of and as a result of the cession. This supervisory jurisdiction, which in 
England was held by the Court of B.R. {Banco Regis), is referred to in Groenve/i v. Burweil, 
(1699), 1 Ld. Raym.454, 3 Salk. 354,91 E.R. 1202, which involved an appeal by a doctor from a 
decision of the Censors of the College of Physicians of London sentencing him to a fine and 
imprisonment. It was objected that the doctor had no remedy, since the statute contained no 
provision for a writ of error or of certiorari. Holt C.J. held : 
That a certiorari lies, for no court can be intended exempt from the superintendency of the 
king in this court of B.R. (Banco Regis). It is a consequence of every inferior jurisdiction of 
record that their proceedings be removable into this court, to inspect the record and see 
whether they keep themselves within the limits of their jurisdiction... 
(TRANSLATION) Applications of this law regarding judicial control arc found in Quebec 
prior to 1849 m Hamilton v. Fraser, (1811), Stu. K.B. 21, in which the Court of King's Bench, in 
a decision delivered in 1811, allowed an application for prohibition against the Vice-Admiralty 
Court, and in King v. Gingras, (1833), Stu. D.B. 560, in which the Provincial Court of Appeal, 
in a decision delivered in 1833, granted an application for certiorari against the commissioners 
for erecting churches. 
A few years later, Chief Justice Fauteux expressed the same views in Séminaire 
de Chicoulimi v. City of Chicoulimi, and he said, at p. 687 : 
Indeed, it is known that on the eve of Confederation the Superior Court still exercised — as it 
had done since its creation 1849 — (a) the general jurisdiction which was conferred by s. 6 of the 
Act of 1849, and extended by s. 2 of c. 78, C.S.L.C. 1860, to hear and determine in the first 
instance all suits or actions which were not exclusively matters for the Circuit or Admiralty 
Courts, and (b) the special jurisdiction conferred on it by s. 7 of the Act of 1849, and extended 
by s. 4 of c. 78, C.S.L.C. 1860, to exercise a superintending and reforming power and control 
over courts of inferior jurisdiction and, in particular, over bodies politic and corporate within 
Lower Canada, including of course municipal corporations. This general jurisdiction, which 
makes the Superior Court the court of original general jurisdiction, is recognized in art. 28 of 
the 1867 Code of Civil Procedure, and while no specific provision is to be found in that Code 
relating to this special superintending and reforming power and control by the Superior Court, 
it can be seen that this power was extended before and after 1867, as appears in s. 2329 of the 
1888 Revised Statutes, the relevant provisions of which were substantially reiterated in Art. 50 
of the 1897 Code and in art. 33 of the present Code. 
This supervisory power of the superior courts over inferior tribunals was not 
exercised by means of an appellate procedure but rather through writs of 
prerogative like mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. The action in nullity or 
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declaratory action was also recognized both in England and here as a proper 
procedure for the exercise of the control power (Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign 
Compensation Commission, at p. 196; l'Alliance des Professeurs catholiques de 
Montréal v. Labour Relations Board of Quebec, at p. 167). 
At the time of Confederation the control by superior courts over inferior 
tribunals was effected mostly through the writ of certiorari. 
In England and in the common law Provinces, the grounds for certiorari fell 
into two broad categories — (i) want or excess of jurisdiction ; and (ii) failure 
on the part of the tribunal to observe the law in the exercise of its jurisdiction 
when such failure was apparent on the face of the record. 
Although the «illegalities» of the second category (generally referred to as 
« error of law on the face of the record») were within the jurisdiction of inferior 
tribunals, the courts nevertheless interfered in certiorari proceedings with the 
erroneous determination of such tribunals. 
In Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Singleton L.J. spoke 
thus, at p. 341 : 
Error on the face of the proceedings has always been recognized as one of the grounds for the 
issue of an order of certiorari. 
Lord Denning reached the same conclusion and added, at p. 346: 
... the Court of King's Bench has an inherent jurisdiction to control all inferior tribunals, not in 
an appellate capacity, but in a supervisory capacity. This control extends not only to seeing that 
the inferior tribunals keep within their jurisdiction, but also to seeing that they observe the law. 
The control is exercised by means of a power to quash any determination by the tribunal which, 
on the face of it, offends against the law. The King's Bench does not substitute its own views for 
those of the tribunal, as a Court of Appeal would do. It leaves it to the tribunal to hear the case 
again, and in a proper case may command it to do so. When the King's Bench exercises its 
control over tribunals in this way, it is not usurping a jurisdiction which does not belong to it. It 
is only exercising a jurisdiction which it has always had. 
and Morris L.J. said, at p. 357: 
It is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in 
order to bring up an order or decision for rehearing of the issue raised in the proceedings. It 
exists to correct error of law where revealed on the face of an order or decision, or irregularity, 
or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction where shown. The control is exercised by removing an 
order or decision, and then by quashing it. 
That such was also the law in Canada is beyond question. In Rex v. Nat Bell 
Liquors Ltd., Lord Sumner pointed out the two areas where the control (as 
opposed to review) could be exercised when he said, at p. 156 : 
That supervision goes to two points: one is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the 
qualifications and conditions of its exercise ; the other is the observance of the law in the course 
of its exercise, 
and later, at p. 161, he added : 
It follows that there is not one law of certiorari before 1848 and another after it, nor one law of 
certiorari for England and another for Canada. 
In Quebec, the situation was not substantially different. The supervisory power 
of the Superior Court extended beyond questions of jurisdiction to include 
illegalities committed by inferior tribunals in the exercise of and within their 
jurisdiction...12 
12. [1978]2S.C.R. 638, p. 649. 
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We therefore concluded that the most appropriate course for a consti-
tutional provision would be to refer, not to any particular list or enumeration 
of grounds of judicial review, but to the basic power by which Canadian 
courts have applied and evolved the concept of judicial review over the years. 
We therefore propose : 
(4) A provincial adjudicative tribunal is subject to supervision and 
control by a superior court; and a federal adjudicative tribunal is subject to 
supervision and control by a superior court or a court created by Parliament, 
concurrently or exclusively. 
— Validation 
If what has been proposed were to become law, and there were to be no 
other changes, an argument might be raised that courts and tribunals not 
within the definition of adjudicative tribunals are invalid. Expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius. By expressly validating adjudicative tribunals, we may 
have, by implication, excluded all other tribunals. Similarly, it might be 
argued that, by entrenching judicial review for adjudicative tribunals, we 
have, by implication excluded judicial review for all other tribunals. 
To avoid these implications, we suggest two clauses. One would validate 
those courts and tribunals that are valid independently of the proposed 
reform. The second would validate any judicial review that exists indepen-
dently of the proposed reform. 
We propose : 
(5) (a) This section shall not be construed as invalidating any court, 
tribunal, board, commission, or authority that is otherwise valid. 
(b) This section shall not be construed as invalidating any ground for 
judicial review that otherwise exists. 
— Independence 
One justification that has been raised for invalidating adjudicative 
tribunals is the need to maintain the independence of the judiciary. The 
federal appointment power, and stringent conditions for removal of superior 
courts justices, have been seen as safeguards to the independence of the 
judiciary. Whether, indeed, the federal appointment power helps maintain 
the independence of the judiciary or not, the concern is a valid one. 
Adjudicative tribunals should be independent. 
The Charter requires that criminal courts be independent (s. 11(d)). 
There is no comparable statement of principle in our Constitution for civil 
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courts, and for adjudicative tribunals. The Constitution needs such a 
statement of principle. 
We propose : 
(6) Every court and every adjudicative tribunal shall be independent and 
impartial. 
One of the advantages of this proposal is to allow the courts to define 
the necessary degrees of independence and impartiality appropriate to each 
adjudicative body. Canadians have inherited a long happy tradition of an 
independent and impartial judiciary. The judiciary is in a unique position to 
decide issues between citizens and government, and now some issues will be 
decided by adjudicative tribunals. It is necessary to maintain the indepen-
dence of arbiters of such questions so that justice may be seen to be done and 
may in fact be done in instances of vital concern to the disputants. 
Conclusion 
We are apprehensive about the government draft amendment. It does 
not appear to achieve its purpose. Furthermore, this section of the consti-
tution is only a small part of a larger scheme for the distribution of judicial 
services represented in the judicature provisions of the Constitution Act, 
1867. The entire system of judicature should be examined in relation to any 
change which is proposed to section 96. If the proposed amendment were in 
place, it could result in a dual court system in all but name. Much more 
thought and effort would be required to arrive at the complete constitutional 
amendment to those provisions. This would include methods of improving 
the judicial system, the appointment of judges, the entrenchment of the 
Supreme Court of Canada and methods of appointment to that court, and 
the express provision for independence of all judges, not only those 
appointed to « superior courts». 
We believe that changes to the constitution should be statements of 
principle and should preserve Canadian concepts of justice and the afore-
mentioned six principles enunciated by the Minister of Justice and this 
Committee. A system of justice should apply equally to both orders of 
government. Both orders of government should be entitled to create one 
common tribunal or court to deal with any common subject matter. 
It would be useful to conduct an examination of the differences between 
boards, tribunals and courts, but these differences or the differentiation of 
subject matters appropriate to both would involve substantial research and 
may prove to be too detailed for inclusion in a constitutional document. 
What is more important is the recognition that we all expect justice to be 
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seen and to be done in our important civil matters. Our tradition and history 
dictate that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Superior Courts must be 
maintained. In an effort to avoid potential problems, we have attempted to 
redraft section 96. We offer the following draft for discussion purposes. Any 
draft amendment to the judicature provisions of the Constitution Act should 
be looked at as a part of a dynamic whole and should be tested by reference 
to those six principles aforementioned. 
Proposed Redraft of Section 96 
96A (1) The Legislature of each province may confer on any adjudicative 
tribunal jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the legislative authority of 
the province. 
(2) Parliament may confer on any adjudicative tribunal jurisdiction in 
respect of any matter within the legislative authority of Parliament. 
(3) An «adjudicative tribunal» is a tribunal, board, commission, or 
authority: 
(a) whose sole or central function is judicial ; and 
(b) which is an element in a scheme for the administration or appli-
cation of a regulatory statute in a specialized field. 
(4) A provincial adjudicative tribunal is subject to supervision and 
control by a superior court ; and a federal adjudicative tribunal is subject 
to supervision and control by a superior court or a court created by 
Parliament, concurrently or exclusively. 
(5) (a) this section shall not be construed as invalidating any court, 
tribunal, board, commission, or authority that is otherwise valid. 
(b) this section shall not be construed as invalidating any ground for 
judicial review that otherwise exists. 
(6) Every court and every adjudicative tribunal shall be independent and 
impartial. 
